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Abstract
I analyze cash ﬂow characteristics of listed infrastructure investment compa-
nies and funds and compare this unique infrastructure sample with a non-
infrastructure reference group. I conﬁrm that infrastructure investment pro-
vide more stable cash ﬂows than non-infrastructure investments. However, I
donot ﬁndthatinvestors positively value thiscash ﬂow stability. Instead, more
volatile cash ﬂows are valued with a premium. On the other hand, earnings
management proxied by accrual volatility is valued with a discount. My pa-
per oﬀers evidence that higher infrastructure investments in general are valued
with a positive ’infrastructure premium’ that is not driven by more stable cash
ﬂows. I ﬁnd additional indications that transparent ﬁnancial and governance
structures as well as regulatory risk play a signiﬁcant role for the valuation of
infrastructure investment companies and funds.
Keywords: infrastructure funds, cash ﬂow volatility
JEL Classiﬁcation: G23, G241 Introduction
Ianalyzecashﬂowcharacteristicsoflistedinfrastructureinvestmentcompaniesand
funds and compare this unique infrastructure sample with a non-infrastructure ref-
erence group. I conﬁrm that infrastructure investment provide more stable cash
ﬂows than non-infrastructure investments. However, I do not ﬁnd that investors
positively value this cash ﬂow stability. Instead, more volatile cash ﬂows are val-
ued with a premium. On the other hand, earnings management proxied by accrual
volatilityisvaluedwithadiscount. Mypaperoﬀersevidencethathigherinfrastruc-
ture investments in general are valued with a positive ’infrastructure premium’ that
is not driven by more stable cash ﬂows. I ﬁnd additional indications that transpar-
ent ﬁnancial and governance structures as well as regulatory risk play a signiﬁcant
role for the valuation of infrastructure investment companies and funds.
Numerous studies have described and analyzed the so-called infrastructure in-
vestment gap. This term describes the fact that globally the demand for infrastruc-
ture investments signiﬁcantly exceeds the volume of ﬁnancing available (e.g. see
OECD (2007), p. 14 ﬀ.). Given ﬁnancial constraints of the public sector that has
served as the major ﬁnancing source for infrastructure assets so far, alternative ﬁ-
nancing sources need to be developed.
Thesolutionmostoftenstatedistofacilitateinvestmentsandthusgetthemoney
from the private sector to narrow the investment gap (Chew (2011), p. 2). Although
the market for infrastructure investments has developed in recent years, it is still
not clear what exactly characterizes ﬁnancing of and investment in infrastructure
assets and thus if they would attract private investors suﬃciently at all. For exam-
ple, infrastructure investments are said to oﬀer long-term, stable and predictable,
inﬂation-linked returns with low correlation to other assets as well as stable operat-
ing cash ﬂows (see e.g. Inderst (2009) and Inderst (2010), Lawrence and Stapledon
(2008)).
Literature on infrastructure investments can be grouped into four categories
(Bitsch et al. (2010)). Empirical studies on direct unlisted (i.e. not publicly traded)
investments such as public-private-partnerships (PPP) and project ﬁnance vehicles
include Välilä (2005), Esty (2003) and Esty (2010), respectively. Empirical studies on
direct listed investments such as infrastructure stocks and bonds include Rothballer
and Kaserer (2011), Roedel and Rothballer (2011) and Sawant (2010a). They ﬁnd
that infrastructure compared to non-infrastructure stocks have signiﬁcantly lower
1systematic risk, higher ﬁrm-speciﬁc risk, but do not provide any signiﬁcant inﬂa-
tion linkage and thus inﬂation hedge for investors. However, infrastructure project
bonds show more stable cash ﬂows compared to equities and a low correlation with
them.
Bitsch et al. (2010) is the ﬁrst paper that empirically analyzes infrastructure in-
vestments by unlisted private equity funds representing unlisted indirect invest-
ments. They were also the ﬁrst to analyze the stability of total cash ﬂows in an in-
frastructure context. The result was that there is no signiﬁcant diﬀerence between
infrastructure and non-infrastructure investments, which could be caused by the
peculiarities of private equity investments and therefore not be representative for
the overall infrastructure market as the authors suggest.1 This paper contributes
to the existing literature as it analyzes operating cash ﬂow variability of listed in-
frastructure funds. They represent the fourth category, listed indirect investments.
There exist only a few studies that focus on corporate governance issues of listed
infrastructure funds. These studies mainly focus on Australia (see Davis (2008), or
Lawrence and Stapledon (2008)). However, no extensive neither global empirical
analysis exists so far. Reasons for this include the fact that private investments into
infrastructure in general are a rather new phenomenon, infrastructure research is a
rather emerging ﬁeld and data is simply rare or not easily accessible.
I contribute to extant research using a unique global sample of 120 listed infras-
tructure investment companies and funds. By integrating an international sample
of listed private equity (LPE) used in Lahr and Herschke (2009), I am able to com-
pare eﬀects for the infrastructure vs. non-infrastructure universe.
Studiesoncapitalallocationdecisionsshowonaveragethatinvestorsvaluesmooth
cash ﬂows positively (e.g. Lang et al. (2003a), Badrinath et al. (1989) or Trueman and
Titman (1988)). In particular, Rountree et al. (2008) show for a sample of US listed
ﬁrms that earnings smoothness is associated with superior ﬁrm valuation. Also if
decomposing earnings, they show that smoothness of the cash ﬂow as well as the
accruals component of earnings positively aﬀects ﬁrm value measured based on To-
bin‘sq. However,investorsdiscriminatebetweenthecomponentsandfocusoncash
ﬂow volatility but ignore accrual volatility.
Evidence on valuation and cash ﬂow characteristics as well as earnings smooth-
ness is of particular interest in the context of the valuation of infrastructure funds.
1Another reason could be data-driven, since their data set contained total cash ﬂows only and did
not allow disentangling between operating and non-operating cash ﬂows.
2Infrastructure is generally assumed to diﬀer not only in operating and risk charac-
teristics, but also to provide a high degree of stable and thus predictable operating
cash ﬂows (see e.g. Davis (2008), Inderst (2009) and Inderst (2010), Lawrence and
Stapledon(2008)). However,therelationshipbetweeninfrastructurefundsandcash
ﬂow smoothness has not been tested empirically up to date.
This paper contributes to this research gap as I ﬁnd no signiﬁcant diﬀerence
between the volatility of net income. However, decomposing net income into the
cash ﬂow and accrual component, I ﬁnd that infrastructure investments oﬀer sig-
niﬁcantly lower volatilities of operating cash ﬂows, which is consistent with the
general assumption. In a next step, I analyze if and to what extent investors price
cash ﬂow volatility at all. Evidence suggests that
i) volatility of net income is not associated with valuation levels. Instead, in-
vestors clearly discriminate between the volatility of cash ﬂow and accrual compo-
nent of earnings which is consistent to Rountree et al. (2008).
ii) Investors value volatility of the cash ﬂow component with a premium but
iii) volatility of the accrual component with a discount.
A positive impact of cash ﬂow volatility on valuation is contrary to Rountree et
al. (2008). However, my empirical evidence is by and large in line with theoretical
considerations on cash ﬂow volatility. Following Merton (1974) and viewing equity
as a call option on ﬁrm value, cash ﬂow volatility should indeed add ﬁrm value as
my results suggest. Chi and Wu (2010) document this positive relation also in an
empirical study for a sample of US listed ﬁrms. They ﬁnd that cash ﬂow volatil-
ity is associated with an economically signiﬁcant increase in ﬁrm value and thus
support my results. Following Leuz et al. (2003), I link accrual volatility to earn-
ings management. Based on agency theory, managers have an incentive to engage
in opportunistic earnings management (e.g. Leuz et al. (2003), Healy and Wahlen
(1999)). By gaining private beneﬁts of control at the expense of investors, this action
is valued negatively as my results suggest.
Additionally, I ﬁnd that investors value infrastructure funds with a general in-
frastructure premium. Although I cannot ﬁnd the economics for this premium, I
can rule out smoother cash ﬂows as main driver. I also link my results to further
transparency implications and address sector-speciﬁc valuation levels within the
infrastructure context.
3The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the sample composition
and gives details on construction of variables and descriptive statistics. In Section 3
I present results from my multivariate analyzes of valuation of cash ﬂow volatility.
Section 4 investigates further results on corporate governance and infrastructure
speciﬁcs, while Section 5 concludes.
2 Data description
2.1 Sample composition
My sample consists of listed (i.e. publicly traded) infrastructure investment vehicles
(IIVs). It is based on the universe of global infrastructure equities as described in
Rothballer and Kaserer (2011).2 Out of this sample, I select all vehicles that have
as a business model to pool money from investors in order to invest into and man-
age a portfolio of infrastructure assets. The underlying assets must be primarily
non-public companies. Thus, an IIV provides the investor with the opportunity to
directly participate in a portfolio of non-public infrastructure assets.
Thereby, I derive a sample of 120 infrastructure investment vehicles with a ma-
jority having their primary listing in the USA (33.3%), Canada (29.2%), Australia or
NewZealand(13.3%)andtheUK(11.7%). Theremainingsampleislistedintherest
of the world including countries such as Brazil, India or Korea (12.5%). Following
Lahr and Herschke (2009), I can split the whole sample of infrastructure investment
vehicles (IIVs) into internally and externally managed vehicles, which I call infras-
tructure investment companies (IICs) and infrastructure investment funds (IIFs), respec-
tively. This gives 45 IICs and 75 IIFs. Figure 1 gives a schematic overview of this
classiﬁcation and lists a few examples for each category.
Insert Figure 1 about here.
Hereby, I refer to an externally managed vehicle if it contracts out management
functions. A well-known example is the so called "infrastructure fund model"3 or
the "... asset-manager model forinfrastructure, where a sponsoring manager - usu-
ally but not always an investment bank - establishes a separate publicly traded en-
2Additionally, I also screened the universe of select ﬁnancials (SIC codes starting with 67, GICS
code 4020, Diversiﬁed Financials) as well as the oil and gas sector (SIC codes starting with 13, GICS
code 101020) backed by an ongoing news search primarily at www.infrastructureinvestor.com.
3Davis (2008), p. 2.
4tity to own infrastructure assets while contracting out management functions to the
sponsor..."4 to which the entity pays fees. These fees mostly consist of a base or
management and a performance fee. However, the fee can also be a ﬁxed amount
written down in a management agreement or include payments to the general part-
ner in case of a limited partnership. Opposite to that, an internally managed vehicle
invests into a portfolio of infrastructure assets with no payments to external man-
agement. This means they employ their own managers. IICs can be hard to dis-
tinguish from operating infrastructure companies and therefore have to make clear
statements regarding their business model, for example "... [our] principal objec-
tive is to generate substantial capital growth for investors by investing principally
in high quality ... infrastructure assets, providing ... sustainable cash ﬂows over
the long term...." 5
To be able to identify infrastructure-speciﬁc characteristics, I include the sample
oflistedprivateequityvehicles(LPE)usedinLahrandHerschke(2009)andKaserer
et al. (2010). Due to the analogous structure of internally managed investment com-
panies vs. externally managed investment funds, I can control for fund and man-
agement structure and thus compare eﬀects between the infrastructure (infra) and
non-infrastructure (non-infra) subsamples. Also Davis (2008) as well as Lawrence
and Stapledon (2008) point out similarities between listed private equity and infras-
tructure investment vehicles.6 This adds 240 vehicles to the sample of which 164 are
internally and 76 externally managed.
2.2 Variables and descriptive statistics
BecauseIamprimarilyinterestedinthevaluationofcashﬂowvolatility,Iﬁrstderive
themeasuresofcashﬂowanditsvolatility. Idecomposeannualnetincome(NI)into
its two components operating cash ﬂow (CF), from now on simply called cash ﬂow,
and accruals (ACC). After standardizing net income and cash ﬂow by total assets,
accrualsarecalculatedforyeartasthediﬀerencebetweennetincomeandoperating
cash ﬂows following Dechow and Dichev (2002):
ACCt = NIt − CFt
4Lawrence and Stapledon (2008), p. 4.
5http://www.eredene.com/approach/investment-policy





NI and CF as well as ii) a minimum of three subsequent year observations.
Insert Table and 2 about here.
Table 1 in the Appendix provides detailed information on how each variable
is derived and calculated. Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics for the volatil-
ity of net income, cash ﬂow and accruals for the total as well as the two infra-/
non-infra subsamples. The volatility of net income vola(NI) does not diﬀer signiﬁ-
cantly between the infra and non-infra subsamples with standard deviations of 0.29
and 0.28, respectively. Similar holds for the volatility for both subsamples of accru-
als vola(ACC), which is on a comparable level with standard deviations of 0.27 and
0.25, respectively. The volatility of cash ﬂows vola(CF), however, shows a diﬀerent
relation. I ﬁnd that with a standard deviation of 0.07, it is signiﬁcantly lower for
IIVs than for the non-infrastructure subsample with a standard deviation of 0.14.7
This result is consistent with the common assumption about cash ﬂow stability of
infrastructure investments as suggested by prior literature (e.g. Inderst (2009), In-
derst (2010) and Lawrence and Stapledon (2008)). Being on average less than half
of accruals volatility, cash ﬂow volatility forms also the smaller component of total
net income volatility.
Due to the fact that I have an unbalanced panel and that I calculate one mea-
sure of cash ﬂow volatility per vehicle over the whole period, I reduce the sample to
cross-sectional observations. Accordingly, I calculate the mean of the standardized
net income, cash ﬂow and accrual over all available years between 2000 and 2010 for
each vehicle to derive NI, CF and ACC. The descriptive statistics provided in Table
2 indicate on average negative accruals that do not diﬀer signiﬁcantly between the
infra and non-infra subsample. However, IIVs oﬀer signiﬁcantly higher and posi-
tive cash ﬂows than non-infra vehicles over the sample period. Corr(CF, ACC) gives
the correlation between cash ﬂows and accruals over all periods per vehicle. The
coeﬃcient is -0.36 for the whole sample and does not diﬀer signiﬁcantly between
the two subsamples.
7For comparison, Francis et al. (2004), p. 986, report an average cash ﬂow volatility of 0.074 for a
large sample of listed US ﬁrms between 1975 and 2001, Dechow and Dichev (2002) a standard devia-
tion of 0.06 between 1987 and 1999.
6Following the same procedure, I also calculate the mean of all accounting obser-
vations such as Tobin’s Q, average total assets measures in USD as well as average
debt-ﬁnancing-ratio. Table 3 also shows the descriptive statistics of the accounting
variables for the total sample as well as both subsamples.
Insert Table 3 about here.
To measure valuation levels of the listed vehicles, I apply Tobin’s Q. It is a proxy
for ﬁrm value as it is commonly used in literature (e.g., see Fang et al. (2009) or
Gompers et al. (2003)). I calculate the variable tobinsQ as the ratio of market value
of equity plus debt and book value of equity plus debt. While the total sample has
an average Tobin’s Q of 1.29, the infra-subsample shows a higher value of 1.53 than
the non-infra subsample of 1.11. This diﬀerence is statistically signiﬁcant and im-
plies that investors value infrastructure vehicles higher than non-infrastructure. I
aim to explore in this paper why this is the case. One possible explanation might
be that investors do value smooth cash ﬂows as reported in Rountree et al. (2008).
As a consequence, investors might value infrastructure investment vehicles higher,
because they have signiﬁcantly lower cash ﬂow volatility, i.e. smoother cash ﬂows.
Although intuitive, I can see later that this line of argumentation cannot be con-
ﬁrmed by multivariate regressions.
The variable totassets gives the average total assets for each vehicle over time and
proxies the size of the vehicles. It is measured in billion USD. The average size of
all vehicles in my total sample is USD 1.12 billion, which is close to the average ﬁrm
size of USD 1.11 billion as reported in Rountree et al. (2008). However, splitting my
sampleintotheinfraandnon-infrasubsamples,Iﬁndthatinfrastructureinvestment
vehicles are with average total assets of USD 1.67 billion signiﬁcantly larger than
the non-infra benchmark with USD 0.68 billion. This is consistent with the general
assumption that infrastructure asset are speciﬁcally large.8 debtﬁn gives the average
debt-ﬁnancing-ratio of each vehicle and measures the leverage. Table 3 shows that
the leverage of my infra subsample is twice as high as for the non-infra subsample
with a statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerence. This is consistent to the general evidence
that infrastructure assets have on average a higher leverage than non-infra assets.9
8For example, see Sawant (2010b), p. 32.
9The absolute level of leverage needs to be interpreted with care. Minority investments below 50%
are recognized using the equity method according to the International Financial Reporting Standards
(IFRS). In this case the leverage in the underlying infrastructure assets is not reﬂected in the leverage
oftheinvestmentvehiclesandleverageoftheinvestmentvehiclesinthissampleisbiaseddownwards.
For example, on an asset level there are high average debt-ﬁnancing ratios of 70% reported (see Esty
(2003) p. 7, or Weisdorf (2007), p. 24).
7Forthesametimeperiod,Ialsocalculatetheunleveredsystematicriskbetaunlev
and annualized idiosyncratic risk idio based on the total monthly returns provided
by Thomson Reuters Datastream. Table 3 also displays the descriptive statistics of
the risk measures. The systematic risk is derived from a one-factor model, whereby
I regress the total return of a local stock index onto the total return of each vehi-
cle. The resulting levered beta is de-levered by the average debt-ﬁnancing-ratio as
described above and proxies the systematic operative risk of each vehicle. Table 3
shows that infrastructure investment vehicles have on average an unlevered beta of
0.49, which is signiﬁcantly lower than for the non-infra subsample with an aver-
age unlevered beta of 0.64. This is close to the results reported by Rothballer and
Kaserer (2011) who ﬁnd an unlevered beta of 0.37 for infrastructure stocks. The
idiosyncratic risk is calculated as the residual between total volatility and the prod-
uct of squared beta of a vehicle with the total volatility of its local market index.
The presented variable idio is annualized. Both risk measures are by construction
contemporaneous measures to the accounting variables described before.
Insert Table 4 about here.
Table 4 shows the table with correlation coeﬃcients between all variables. It
shows that in a univariate analysis none of the risk measure is signiﬁcantly corre-
lated to ﬁrm value. Intuitively, higher levels of net income, cash ﬂows and accruals
are positively correlated to ﬁrm value. Consistent with Dechow and Dichev (2002),
Table 4 shows signiﬁcantly positive correlations between net income and cash ﬂow
as well as net income and accruals. It also conﬁrms the signiﬁcant negative correla-
tion between cash ﬂow and accruals as reported in Table 2. However, it is not cor-
related to ﬁrm value. This is also the case for volatility of net income. Interestingly,
the volatilities of its two components cash ﬂow and accruals have a signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent relation with valuation. Volatility of accruals vola(ACC) is signiﬁcantly
positively related to valuation levels, whereas volatility of cash ﬂows vola(CF) is
positively - although not signiﬁcantly - correlated to valuation levels. This provides
ﬁrstempiricalevidencethatinvestorsdosigniﬁcantlydiﬀerentiatebetweenthecash
ﬂow and the accrual component, which I aim to further investigate in the following.
Another signiﬁcant ﬁnding is that large ﬁrms as well as ﬁrms with higher debt lev-
elsarevaluedwithasigniﬁcantpremiumandatthesametimeprovidesigniﬁcantly
more stable net income, cash ﬂows and accruals. The relation between size and the
three volatility measures is consistent with Dechow and Dichev (2002).10
10See Dechow and Dichev (2002), p. 47.
8Thefactthatthedummyvariableforinfrastructureinvestmentvehiclesishighly
positively correlated to valuation encourages further exploring the determinants
of valuation in the context of infrastructure. However, because IIVs correspond
to larger size and higher debt levels at the same time, I need to control for these
characteristics in a multivariate analysis.
We therefore apply in the following section multivariate regression analyses to
ask if and to what extent investors value cash ﬂow stability of infrastructure invest-
ment vehicles.
3 How do investors value cash ﬂow volatility
3.1 Multivariate regressions
Following Shin and Stulz (2000) as well as Rountree et al. (2008) I run pooled regres-
sions on Tobin’s Q, whereby the accounting variables and risk measures described
in the previous section serve as independent variables. Because independent and
dependent variables refer to the time frame 2000 through 2010, I can verify if there
is a contemporaneous eﬀect on the level of valuation. In particular, this enables us
to analyze if and to what extent investors value cash ﬂow volatility of infrastruc-
ture investment vehicles. I perform an ln-transformation with all variables given in
a cardinal scale indicated by the Ln-preﬁx at the beginning of the variable names.
This does not only allow for an easier interpretation of log-log regression models,
but also further controls for potential outliers.11
In the following regressions, I control for year eﬀects by adding dummies for
every year between 2000 and 2010. They take on the value one if for a given vehi-
cle if it was active, i.e. listed, in this particular observation year. Because I use a
sample of global vehicles from regions with diﬀerent regulation or reporting stan-
dardsandpractice,IalsocontrolforsuchinstitutionalcharacteristicsfollowingLeuz
(2010). Theyclusteredcountriesintothreeclusters:12 1)outsidereconomiesthatare
"characterized by large stock markets, low ownership concentration, extensive out-
sider rights, high disclosure and strong legal enforcement", 2) insider economies
with strong legal enforcement, but "smaller stock markets, higher ownership con-
centration, weaker investor protection, and lower disclosure levels and 3) insider
11See also Rountree et al. (2008), p. 241.
12See Leuz (2010), Table 3, Panel C.
9economies with similar characteristics as countries in the second cluster but with
weak legal enforcement.13 The data and clustering is an updated and extended ver-
sion of Leuz et al. (2003). It is based on reporting practice and regulatory data from
Djankov et al. (2008), Licht et al. (2007) and La Porta et al. (2006) amongst others. I
control for these institutional characteristics by using dummy variables if a vehicle
inmysamplehasitsprimaryexchangelistinginoneoftheclustersdescribedabove.
Outsider economies in cluster one include countries such as Australia, Canada, the
USA and the UK. 79.45% of all vehicles in my sample are in this cluster. Cluster two
includes most continental European countries such as France, Germany, Nether-
lands, Switzerland as well as Japan and South Korea. 15.42% of all vehicles in my
sample are in this cluster. The remaining 5.14% of my sample is listed in countries
such as Brazil, India or Taiwan, which are contained in cluster three.
I also control if particular infrastructure sectors experienced a signiﬁcant pre-
mium or discount by investors. Hereby I diﬀerentiate between the sectors trans-
portation, electricity, oil and gas, water, telecommunication and social infrastruc-
ture. I incorporate this by adding dummy variables that take on the value one if the
vehicle has invested in this sector in any year between 2000 and 2010.
Insert Table 5 about here.
Regressions(1)and(2)inTable5showtheregressionresultswiththeLn-transformed
Tobin’s Q as dependent variable. I apply ordinary least square regressions (OLS)
with White’s heteroscedasticity-consistent estimators. Although I control for year
and institutional eﬀects as described above, I do not display the results for those
dummies for a better overview. Both regression speciﬁcations are identical except
that regression (1) includes volatility of net income vola(NI) as an independent vari-
able. Regression (2) lacks this variable and splits this into the volatilities of its cash
ﬂow and accrual component, vola(CF) and vola(ACC), respectively.
Similar to Rountree et al. (2008), leverage is negatively but not statistically sig-
niﬁcant, associated with valuation level in both regressions. Opposite to this, I ﬁnd
a signiﬁcant positive relation between the proxy for ﬁrm size and valuation. This
impliesthatlargerﬁrmstradeatapremiumcomparedtosmallerones. Thetworisk
measures for systematic and idiosyncratic risk have both a positive but not signiﬁ-
cant inﬂuence.
Icanconﬁrmtheindicationsoftheunivariateﬁndingsonvolatilitiesreportedin
13See Leuz (2010), p. 21.
10Table4. First,volatilityofnetincomehasnosigniﬁcantinﬂuenceonvaluationlevels
as shown in regression (1). Instead, I can conﬁrm discriminating eﬀects on valua-
tion when decomposing net income into its components as shown in regression (2),
which is by and large consistent to Rountree et al. (2008). However, I report oppos-
ingeﬀectswhereinvestorsvaluecashﬂowvolatilitypositivelyandaccrualvolatility
negatively. These eﬀects are highly signiﬁcant and also robust as shown below in
Section 3.2. The decomposition even increases the already high explanatory power
of the regression from an adjusted R-squared of 34.1% to 36.2% - compared to 22.9%
and 27.3% reported for similar regressions in Rountree et al. (2008). This suggests
that investors signiﬁcantly diﬀerentiate between the cash ﬂow and accrual compo-
nent of net income to a similar magnitude: an increase of cash ﬂow volatility by 1%
is associated with an increase in value of approximately 0.09%, whereas an increase
of accrual volatility by 1% is associated with a decrease in value of approximately
0.08%. For comparison, Chi and Wu (2010) also ﬁnd an economically signiﬁcant
increase in value of approximately 0.14% for a 1% increase in cash ﬂow volatility.
Second, the fact that cash ﬂow volatility is positively valued in my sample does
not conﬁrm the ﬁndings of Rountree et al. (2008) that investors value smooth cash
ﬂows. In contrary, following Merton (1974) and viewing equity as a call option on
ﬁrm value, then cash ﬂow volatility should indeed add ﬁrm value which is consis-
tent with what my results suggest. Similarly, Pastor and Veronesi (2003) interpret
cash ﬂow volatility as uncertainty over future growth opportunities, which imply a
positive valuation of cash ﬂow volatility. Additionally, this positive relation is also
documented in the empirical study by Chi and Wu (2010). They even ﬁnd evidence
that the negative impact of cash ﬂow volatility on ﬁrm value reported in Rountree
et al. (2008) is due to the fact that non-standardized per-share volatilities were used.
If cash ﬂows are standardized for total assets as I did in this paper, they ﬁnd that
the negative relation turns positive as reported in my paper. A positive relation can
also be supported by the theoretical agency argument that managers cannot diver-
sify suﬃciently the stream of income they receive from the ﬁrm. As a consequence,
they engage in lower levels of ﬁrm risk associated with lower cash ﬂow volatilities
and thus decrease ﬁrm value (Amihud and Lev (1981)).14 Higher ﬁrm risk and cash
ﬂow volatilities can limit this ineﬃciency and thus increase ﬁrm value.
Third, accrual volatility is clearly valued by investors at a discount. I explain
this with opportunistic managers who manipulate accruals and therefore reduce
14See Chi and Wu (2010), p. 18.
11the wealth of shareholders. Based on principal-agent theory, managers have an in-
formational advantage over the investor about the true state of the company. At
the same time, managers have some accounting discretion about accruals and thus
reported earnings. Following Leuz et al. (2003) and Healy and Wahlen (1999), the
manager has an incentive to use this discretion to misrepresent ﬁrm performance in
order to gain private control beneﬁts at the expense of the investors.15 For example,
managers could try to avoid the reporting of large losses to mitigate disciplinary ac-
tion against him (e.g. Degeorge et al. (1999)). I can therefore interpret accruals and
accrual volatility as proxy for earnings management. Because such action by man-
agers reduces the wealth of shareholders, investors value this with a discount as
conﬁrmed in my empirical analysis. Alternatively, Dechow and Dichev (2002) iden-
tify both accrual and earnings volatility as proxy for accrual and earnings quality,
where a higher volatility signiﬁes lower quality.
Regression (3) underpins the eﬀect of earnings management by adding corr(CF,
ACC) as independent variable. It is commonly used in literature as proxy for earn-
ings smoothing which is a particular form of earnings management (e.g. Lang et
al. (2003b), Leuz et al. (2003), Barton (2001)). In times of volatile cash ﬂows, man-
agers can report negative accruals to partially oﬀset high cash ﬂows and vice versa
to smoothen net income and earnings. Similar to Rountree et al. (2008), the neg-
ative and signiﬁcant coeﬃcient shows that the more negative the correlation, i.e.
the more earnings smoothing by the management, the larger the discount for ﬁrm
value. Byaddingthisvariable, notonlythesigniﬁcanceofthenegativeimpactofac-
crual volatility on valuation increased, also the R-squared of the overall regressions
increased to high 37.1%.
Thus, bothproxiesforearningsmanagement, correlationbetweencashﬂowand
accruals as well as volatility of accruals, consistently show that earnings manage-
ment is valued with a discount by investors. Following Lang et al. (2011), I can also
relate earnings management to the level of transparency for investors. The more
managers engage in earnings management, the less transparency there is about the
true economic performance about the ﬁrm, and the more ﬁrms are valued with a
15This action is also referred to as asset expropriation, see Lang and Maﬀett (2010), p. 33. Alter-
natively, a positive eﬀect of transparency on ﬁrm valuation could also be explained by an eﬃcient
resource allocation, see Lang and Maﬀett (2010), p. 29.
12discount.16
So far, the interpretations of regressions referred to my whole sample of invest-
ment vehicles including infra as well as non-infra. One could argue that infra ve-
hicles should then be valued by investors at discounts if they i) show signiﬁcantly
lower cash ﬂow volatility as reported in Table 2 and ii) cash ﬂow smoothness is
punished by investors as shown above. Nevertheless, I ﬁnd higher valuation lev-
els for infra vehicles vs. non-infra vehicles. Table 3 showed an average Tobin’s Q
of 1.53 for infra vehicles, which is signiﬁcantly higher than the one of 1.11 for non-
infra vehicles. My regression model suggests that the discount from smooth cash
ﬂows for infrastructure vehicles is at least partially oﬀset by a general infrastruc-
ture premium shown by the positive and highly signiﬁcant regression coeﬃcient
for the dummy variable infra. For example, Regression (2) in Table 5 implies infras-
tructure investment vehicles on average are ceteris paribus valued 48% higher than
non-infrastructureinvestmentvehicles. Thismeansdespitecontrollingforriskmea-
sures,accountingcharacteristics,timeorinstitutionaleﬀects,thereisanunobserved
characteristic of infrastructure vehicles in my model that causes this infrastructure
premium. One of the myriad possibilities might be a money chasing deals phe-
nomenon. This describes the empirical fact that private equity can be subject to
overinvestment, so that asset prices go up and performance goes down.17 Reasons
for this include that the market for private equity investments is segmented with a
limited number of potential investments that are illiquid. This implies that in times
of high capital inﬂows into this particular market, the supply of potential invest-
ments does not adjust suﬃciently and valuations increase. Because also infrastruc-
ture assets are subject to these conditions, this phenomenon might also occur for
infrastructure investment vehicles as indicated in previous literature.18 However,
this remains an assumption with no clear empirical indication.
To show that the valuation eﬀects described above don’t only hold for the total
but also for the infra and non-infra subsample I perform similar regressions for the
two subsamples separately in the next section besides other robustness checks.
16Lang et al. (2011) show empirically for a large sample of international ﬁrms that lower trans-
parency lowers liquidity, and thus increases expected return and cost of capital, which leads to
lower valuations. The mediator between transparency and valuation here is liquidity instead of cash
ﬂows. However, the net eﬀect could be positive or negative, considering the possible costs of trans-
parency. For example, earnings management through earnings smoothing could also reduce cost of
debt through lower default risk for creditors. See also Lang and Maﬀett (2010), p. 28.
17See for example Gompers and Lerner (2000) as well as Diller and Kaserer (2009).
18Orr and Kennedy (2008), p. 99, or Lawrence and Stapledon (2008), p. 25.
133.2 Robustness checks
The main goal of this section is to show that the positive valuation of cash ﬂow
volatility shown in Section 3.1 is not driven by misspeciﬁcation of the regression.
In speciﬁc, I show that the results are robust to alternative speciﬁcations of the de-
pendent as well as independent variables and hold for subsamples, too. Table 6
provides the series of robustness checks.
In Table 6 I perform the same regressions as in Table 5, now separately for the
infra (Regressions 1 and 2) and non-infra sample (Regressions 3 and 4). Because the
number of observations sharply drops, the explanation power of these regressions
aswellassigniﬁcanceoftheirindependentvariablesisratherlow. Nevertheless,the
regressions conﬁrm for both subsamples the positive eﬀect of cash ﬂow volatility
and negative eﬀect of accrual volatility on valuation. I ﬁnd additionally that within
theinfrasample,leveragehasahighlysigniﬁcantnegativeimpactonvaluation. This
might be an indicator for the criticism that some infrastructure investment vehicles
have exceeded optimal levels of leverage.19
Regressions (5) and (6) show that the results on cash ﬂow volatility reported in
Table 5 are also robust if I use the Ln-transformation of the market-to-book value
LnMV BV as an alternative valuation measure.
In regressions(7) and (8) I have also includedreturn on assets as a proxy of prof-
itabilityfollowingRountreeetal.(2008). Ihavenotincludedthisvariableinthepre-
viousanalysisinTable5,becausethisvariableisnotavailableformanyobservations
and thus further decrease my sample size. The regressions show that including the
Ln-transformation of return on assets Ln_ROA, sample size is decreased but ex-
planatory power signiﬁcantly increased expressed by an adjusted R-squared to up
to 44%. More importantly, the eﬀects of cash ﬂow volatility as described for Table
5 are robust. Also, return on assets has a signiﬁcantly positive impact on valuation
levels. This is consistent with the results reported in Rountree et al. (2008).
The regression results from Table 5 might have also been biased because I con-
structed the measures of volatilities based on diﬀerent numbers of cash ﬂow ob-
servations due to the unbalanced structure of the panel. With a mean and median
number of cash ﬂow observations of 6.52 and 7, respectively, I perform the same
regressions as in Table 5 except with a minimum number of cash ﬂow observations
of 7 instead of 3. Regressions (9) and (10) in Table 6 show that my results are also
19See Davis (2008), p. 8, or Lawrence and Stapledon (2008), p. 22 ﬀ.
14robust to this robustness check.
Finally,theelevatedvarianceinﬂationfactors(VIFs)giveriseforaconcernabout
multi-collinearity amongst the independent variables of the regressions in Table 5
and 6. However, the values of max VIF without year and institutional cluster dummies
show that for all regressions the maximum VIF is smaller than 3 when the dummy
variables controlling for year and institutional eﬀects are not included in the re-
gressions. This shows that some of the control variables are slightly correlated, but
multi-collinearity is not an issue amongst the main explanatory variables.
4 Further results
Besides the main results on cash ﬂow volatility and earnings management pre-
sented in Section 3, Table 5 also reveals a highly signiﬁcant and economically mean-
ingful discount for externally managed vehicles. In the context of infrastructure
funds for example, Davis (2008) mentions "complex and opaque ﬁnancial" struc-
tures that "make the true ﬁnancial position of the fund hard to determine".20 This
could also facilitate managers to gain private control beneﬁts or reduces the share-
holders" monitoring capabilities, similar to the earnings management described
above. Furthermore, Lawrence and Stapledon (2008) list concerns on the gover-
nance structure that can lead amongst others to less transparency or misalignment
of interests between shareholders and managers and thus reduce valuation of in-
frastructure funds.
Orr and Kennedy (2008) point out that transparency is speciﬁcally necessary for
ﬁnancing infrastructure projects through capital markets, which requires "ongoing
and high quality disclosure of operating and ﬁnancial performance" of the assets.21
Greater transparency further develops this market, increases investment and ceteris
paribus positively aﬀects valuations. Earnings management or intransparent legal
and organizational structures, however, is not likely to enhance such qualities.
TheregressionresultsinTable5alsoreportasigniﬁcantpremiumforinvestment
vehicles that invest in the oil and gas sector. On the other hand, vehicles that invest
in the transportation and electricity sectors are valued at a signiﬁcant and econom-
ically meaningful discount. These results are also valid after the robustness checks
in Table 6. It is likely that those sector-speciﬁc valuations depend to a large extent to
20Davis (2008), p. 8.
21Orr and Kennedy (2008), p. 104.
15sector-speciﬁc risks and regulations. For example, Bitsch et al. (2010) report signiﬁ-
cantlyhigherreturnsforthetransportsectorwithintheinfrastructureuniverse. The
authors suggest this might be driven by a high degree of government intervention
and less independent regulation. This could lead to higher investment uncertainty
and thus higher cost of capital, which could imply lower valuations similar to my
results. However, sector-speciﬁc risk and return proﬁles are heterogeneous and re-
quire more attention and research to enable robust conclusions.
5 Summary
It is widely believed that infrastructure investments oﬀer some typical ﬁnancial
characteristics such as long-term, stable and predictable, inﬂation-linked cash ﬂows
with low correlation to other assets. However, research on infrastructure invest-
ments is an emerging ﬁeld and the number of studies is till limited. So far, the
existing empirical research on infrastructure mainly focuses on listed infrastructure
companies, public-private-partnerships (PPP) or project ﬁnance.
This paper contributes to a research gap as it provides ﬁrst empirical evidence
for a larger sample of listed infrastructure investment vehicles. I categorize them
into internally and externally managed vehicles, which I label infrastructure invest-
ment companies and infrastructure investment funds, respectively. Comparing this
sample to a non-infrastructure reference group of listed private equity vehicles, I
can conﬁrm the common hypothesis that infrastructure investments provide more
stable operating cash ﬂows than non-infrastructure investments.
In a next step, I analyze if and to what extent investors price cash ﬂow volatility
at all. First, evidence suggests that volatility of net income is not associated with
valuation levels. Instead, investors clearly discriminate between the volatility of
cash ﬂow and accrual component of earnings that is consistent to existing litera-
ture. Second, I ﬁnd that investors value volatility of the cash ﬂow component with
a premium. Although existing theoretical as well as empirical literature provides
evidence for both a negative and positive relation, I explain this result by viewing
equity as a call option on ﬁrm value. In this context, cash ﬂow volatility should
indeed add ﬁrm value as my results suggest.
Third, I ﬁnd that volatility of the accrual component is valued with a discount
on valuation levels. This negative relation between accruals and valuation levels is
16by and large consistent with existing literature. I relate this ﬁnding to discounts for
opportunistic earnings management by mangers at the expense of investors.
Overall,infrastructureinvestmentvehiclesarevaluedatasigniﬁcant’infrastruc-
ture premium’ over the non-infrastructure reference group. One rationale for this
might be that infrastructure investments considered in this time period have been
subjecttotheso-calledmoneychasingdealsphenomenon. AlthoughIhavenoclear
indicationfortheeconomicsofthisresult, Icansaythatitisnotthemorestablecash
ﬂows that lead to the higher valuation levels.
Further results suggest that not only earnings management but also externally
managed vehicles are valued at a discount. I relate this to complex ﬁnancial and
governancestructures. Possiblereasonsforthisincludelesstransparencythatleads
to agency conﬂicts and lower valuations. I also ﬁnd that investment vehicles that in-
vest into oil and gas infrastructure are valued at a premium as opposed to vehicles
investing into transportation or electricity infrastructure, which are valued at a dis-
count. Likely reasons for this include diﬀering regulatory risks.
Summing up, my paper supports the perception that infrastructure investment
vehicles do have speciﬁc characteristics that are of interest to institutional investors.
Most importantly, they provide more stable operating cash ﬂows. However, in-
vestors do not positively value this as often perceived. An overall positive ’infras-
tructure premium’ reveals that a more detailed picture the infrastructure market is
still needed. For example, the inﬂuence of regulatory risk needs to be better under-
stood. In this regard, my paper oﬀers some limited evidence that can be used as a
starting point for future research.
17Figures
Figure 1: Overview of infrastructure investment vehicles, companies and funds
I              I          V        (IIV )
I          M       I          
     I          C         (IIC )
E          M       I          
     I          F     (IIF )
• BF Utilities Ltd. • Brookﬁeld Renewable Power
• Cheung Kong Infrastructure Hold-
ings
• HSBC Infrastructure Company
• Eredene Capital • Macquarie Infrastructure Group
• GTL Infrastructure Ltd. • Prime Infrastructure Group
• IPSA Group plc • Utilico Investment Trust plc
... ...
Note: The ﬁgure gives an overview of infrastructure investment vehicles (IIVs). IIVs
can be categorized in internally and externally managed vehicles, called in-
frastructure investment companies (IICs) and infrastructure investment funds
(IIFs). Examples for each subsample are given.
Source: own contribution, based on Lahr and Herschke (2009)
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Table 1: Deﬁnition of variables, listed funds
C        V             D          
Dependent tobinsQ Averageofallavailableyearlyobservationsforthesumofmarketcap-
italization (TOB item: ws.yrendmarketcap) and total debt (TOB item:
ws.totaldebt) divided by the sum of total shareholders’ equity (TOB
item: totalshareholderequity)andtotaldebt(TOBitem: ws.totaldebt).
MVBV Average of all available yearly observations for market capitalization
(TOBitem: ws.yrendmarketcap)dividedbytotalshareholders’equity
(TOB item: totalshareholderequity).
Earnings component NI Average of all available yearly observations of net income (TOB item:
ws.netincome) standardized by total assets of the vehicle (TOB item:
ws.totalassets).
CF Average of all available yearly observations of operating cash ﬂows
(TOB item: ws.NetCashFlowOperatingCFStmt) standardized by total
assets of the vehicle (TOB item: ws.totalassets).
ACC Average of all available yearly observations of accruals, whereby ac-
cruals is the diﬀerence between standardized yearly net income and
operating cash ﬂows (see NI, CF above).
corr(CF, ACC) Correlationbetweenstandardizedyearlycashﬂowandaccrualobser-
vations (see CF, ACC above).
vola(NI) Standard deviation of yearly, standardized net income observations
(see NI above).
vola(CF) Standard deviation of yearly, standardized net income observations
(see CF above).
vola(ACC) Standard deviation of yearly, standardized accrual observations (see
ACC above).
Accounting totassets Averageofallavailableyearlyobservationsfortotalassets ofa vehicle
in USD (TOB item: ws.totalassetsUSD).
debtﬁn Average of all available yearly observations of debt (TOB item:
ws.totaldebt) divided by total assets of a vehicle (TOB item:
ws.totalassets).
ROA Average of all available yearly observations for return on assets (TOB
item: ws.returnonassets).
Risk beta_unlev Betaofavehicledeleverdwithitsdebt-equityratiousingtheHamada
equation. Beta is the regression coeﬃcient from the one-factor-model
regressing return of the market index on vehicle return. Market in-
dex is the MSCI country index for each vehicle. All returns are total
monthly returns between 2000 and 2010 and obtained from Thomson
Reuters Datastream. Debt-equity ratio is the average of all available
yearly observations of debt (TOB item: ws.totaldebt) divided by eq-
uity (TOB item: ws.totalshareholderequity). A corporate tax rate of
30% is applied.
idio Annualized idiosyncratic risk, whereby idiosyncratic risk is the
square root of the diﬀerence between return variance of a vehicle and
the product of its squared beta multiplied with ist market index’ re-
turnvariance. Allreturnsaretotalmonthlyreturnsbetween2000and
2010 and obtained from Thomson Reuters Datastream.
19Table 1 continued:
Structure/industry infra Dummy variable equal to 1 for infrastructure vehicles.
external Dummy variable equal to 1 for externally managed vehicles.
oil_gas Dummy variable equal to 1 for externally vehicles that have
invested into oil or gas infrastructure.
transport Dummy variable equal to 1 for externally vehicles that have
invested into transportation infrastructure.
electricity Dummy variable equal to 1 for externally vehicles that have
invested into elictricity infrastructure.
Note: Column ‘Category’ shows if the variable refers to the category earnings management, account-
ing, risk or structure/ industry. The ’Ln’-preﬁx of a variable name indicates that the natural
logarithm of the observations is taken. ’TOB item’ is the name as indicated in the database
ThomsonONEBanker.
20Table 2: Cash ﬂow and volatility statistics
I     N         T           
Variable Mean Median Min Max Std dev N Mean Median Min Max Std dev N Sign Mean Median Min Max Std dev N
NI 0 0.03 -0.95 0.13 0.14 108 -0.38 0 -16.93 0.11 2.01 139 ** -0.22 0.01 -16.93 0.13 1.52 247
CF 0.06 0.07 -0.57 0.22 0.12 106 -0.06 -0.01 -1.93 0.19 0.21 140 *** -0.01 0.02 -1.93 0.22 0.18 246
ACC -0.06 -0.06 -0.38 0.25 0.07 109 -0.3 0 -16.05 0.24 1.85 138 - -0.20 -0.03 -16.05 0.25 1.38 247
Corr(CF, ACC) -0.42 -0.55 -1.00 0.99 0.5 111 -0.32 -0.46 -1.00 0.99 0.58 142 - -0.36 -0.53 -1.00 0.99 0.55 253
vola(NI) 0.29 0.04 0.00 23.16 2.21 110 0.28 0.08 0.00 7.00 0.77 139 - 0.28 0.06 0.00 23.16 1.57 249
vola(CF) 0.07 0.04 0.01 1.12 0.12 109 0.14 0.05 0.01 1.64 0.27 141 *** 0.11 0.05 0.01 1.64 0.22 250
vola(ACC) 0.27 0.04 0.01 21.00 2.00 110 0.25 0.12 0.00 4.46 0.47 139 - 0.26 0.07 0.00 21.02 1.37 249
Table 3: Risk and accounting statistics
I     N         T           
Variable Mean Median Min Max Std dev N Mean Median Min Max Std dev N Sign Mean Median Min Max Std dev N
tobinsQ 1.53 1.43 0.56 3.87 0.58 108 1.11 0.97 0.52 3.38 0.52 139 *** 1.29 1.11 0.52 3.87 0.58 247
beta_unlev 0.49 0.48 -0.09 1.48 0.33 98 0.64 0.48 -0.20 2.29 0.52 133 ** 0.58 0.48 -0.20 2.29 0.46 231
idio 0.39 0.29 0.15 1.41 0.25 99 0.44 0.39 0.14 1.67 0.26 135 * 0.42 0.34 0.14 1.67 0.26 234
totassets(USDbn) 1.67 0.88 0.00 12.61 2.14 106 0.68 0.09 0.00 11.87 1.74 135 *** 1.12 0.26 0.00 12.61 1.99 241
debtﬁn 0.35 0.33 0.00 0.81 0.19 109 0.20 0.17 0.00 1.00 0.20 154 *** 0.27 0.26 0.00 1.00 0.20 224
external 0.61 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.49 111 0.29 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.45 142 *** 0.61 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.50 253
Note: Table 2 gives descriptive statistics of cash ﬂow and volatility measures, Table 3 gives descriptive statistics of risk and accounting measures for all vehicles with a minimum
number of 3 cash ﬂow observations. Statistics are given for the full sample as well as the infra and non-infra subsamples. Column "Sign" indicates whether the diﬀerence
between the infra and the non-infra subsample is signiﬁcant, as measured by the test for diﬀerence in mean. The asterisks indicate the level of signiﬁcance (*, **, *** signiﬁcant
at the 10-, 5- and 1-percent levels, respectively).
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Note: Coeﬃcients display Spearman’s correlation coeﬃcients for all vehicles with a minimum number of 3 cash ﬂow observations. Exception: the coeﬃcient
between dummy variables infra and external displays Cramer’s V. The asterisks indicate the level of signiﬁcance for the test of independence (*, **, ***
signiﬁcant at the 10-, 5- and 1-percent levels, respectively).
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2Table 5: Main regressions
Model number ( ) ( ) ( )
Variables L _      Q L _      Q L _      Q
Ln_beta_unlev 0.0002 0.0043 0.0013
(0.01) (0.12) (0.04)
Ln_idio 0.0244 0.0642 0.0477
(0.41) (1.09) (0.81)
Ln_vola(NI) 0.0343 - -
(1.21)
Ln_vola(CF) - 0.0855 ∗∗∗ 0.1070 ∗∗∗
(2.72) (3.02)
Ln_vola(ACC) - -0.0758 ∗∗ -0.0901 ∗∗∗
(-2.46) (-2.77)
corr(CF, ACC) - - 0.0920 ∗
(1.72)
Ln_totassets 0.0194 0.0212 0.0251
(1.12) (-2.46) (1.37)
Ln_debtﬁn -0.0093 -0.0133 -0.0065
(-0.60) (-0.84) (-0.42)
infra 0.4170 ∗∗∗ 0.3900 ∗∗∗ 0.3660 ∗∗∗
(0.88) (5.27) (4.92)
external -0.1500 ∗∗∗ -0.1650 ∗∗∗ -0.1450 ∗∗
(-2.65) (-2.85) (-2.51)
oil_gas 0.1190 ∗∗ 0.1030 ∗ 0.0922 ∗
(2.16) (1.89) (1.72)
transport -0.1800 ∗∗∗ -0.1590 ∗∗ -0.1640 ∗∗∗
(-2.88) (-2.58) (-2.75)
electricity -0.1530 ∗∗ -0.1450 ∗∗ -0.1440 ∗∗
(-2.44) (-2.34) (-2.34)
constant 0.1500 0.0942 0.1377
(0.72) (0.45) (0.67)
year dummies yes yes yes
institutional cluster dummies yes yes yes
Number of observations 188 188 188
F-statistic 5.85 ∗∗∗ 5.55 ∗∗∗ 5.39 ∗∗∗
Max. VIF 5.60 5.40 5.41
Max. VIF without year and 2.24 2.77 2.88
instituional cluster dummies
Adjusted R2 34.10% 36.2% 37.1%
Note: The table gives the results of OLS regressions for the full sample with Ln_TobinsQ as dependent vari-
able and a minimum of 3 cash ﬂow observations per vehicle. Regression (1) includes volatility of net
income vola(NI) as exogenous variable. Regression (2) includes its components volatility of cash ﬂow
vola(CF) and accrual vola(ACC) instead. Both regressions use White’s heteroscedasticity-consistent esti-
mators. The independent variables are listed in the ﬁrst column. The second and third columns show
the non-standardized coeﬃcients of each exogenous variable and the associated t-statistics. The asterisks
indicate the level of signiﬁcance (*, **, *** signiﬁcant at the 10-, 5- and 1-percent levels, respectively).
23Table 6: Robustness checks
M        .                      
       ,             
   .                      
       ,                 
   .               
            ,            
   .               
            ,            
   .               
            ,            
N      ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) (  )
Variables L _      Q L _      Q L _      Q L _      Q L _MVBV L _MVBV L _      Q L _      Q L _      Q L _      Q
Ln_ROA - - - - - - 0.0435 0.0489 ∗ - -
(1.30) (1.70) - -
Ln_beta_unlev 0.0255 0.0254 0.0205 0.0199 -0.0793 -0.0736 0.0314 0.047 0.0515 0.0586
(0.65) (0.64) (0.39) (0.38) (-1.53) (-1.43) (0.74) (1.26) (1.18) (1.58)
Ln_idio -0.1864 -0.1279 0.1360 0.1490 ∗ 0.0417 0.0952 0.0332 0.0757 -0.0203 0.0246
(-2.36) (-1.69) (1.55) (1.74) (0.47) (1.07) (0.51) (1.19) (-0.33) (0.42)
Ln_vola(NI) 0.0067 - 0.0346 - 0.0620 - 0.0101 - 0.0184 -
(0.16) (1.02) (1.51) (0.28) (0.48)
Ln_vola(CF) - 0.0919 ∗ - 0.0372 - 0.110 ∗∗ - 0.0774 ∗∗∗ - 0.0914 ∗∗
(1.92) (0.90) (2.43) (2.41) (2.36)
Ln_vola(ACC) - -0.1190 - -0.0210 - -0.0793 ∗ - -0.107 ∗∗∗ - -0.1060 ∗∗
(-1.61) (-0.49) (-1.76) (-2.69) (-2.53)
Ln_totassets -0.0269 -0.0281 0.0266 0.0247 0.0582 ∗∗ 0.0607 ∗∗ 0.0150 0.0139 0.0102 0.0100
(-0.98) (-0.99) (1.37) (1.15) (2.49) (2.35) (0.70) (0.64) (0.44) (0.41)
Ln_debtﬁn -0.0647 ∗∗∗ -0.0642 ∗∗ -0.0148 -0.0191 0.0006 ∗∗ -0.0057 -0.0035 -0.0080 -0.0150 -0.0209
(-2.48) (-2.32) (-1.11) (-1.32) (0.03) (-0.30) (-0.24) (-0.59) (-0.53) (-0.74)
infra - - - - 0.5860 ∗∗∗ -0.5600 ∗∗∗ 0.3960 ∗∗∗ 0.3840 ∗∗∗ 0.4970 ∗∗∗ 0.4570 ∗∗∗
(5.76) (4.97) (4.57) (4.79) (5.76) (5.44)
external -0.0502 -0.0497 -0.2840 ∗∗∗ -0.3230 ∗∗∗ -0.1170 -0.1390 ∗ -0.1580 ∗∗ -0.1890 ∗∗∗ -0.1940 ∗∗∗ -0.1990 ∗∗∗
(-0.83) (-0.82) (-2.83) (-3.08) (-1.47) (-1.71) (-2.35) (-2.88) (-2.92) (-2.95)
oil_gas 0.1124 0.0936 0.0272 0.0464 0.0681 0.0483 0.0715 0.0515 0.0821 0.0687
(1.53) (1.49) (0.37) (0.63) (0.77) (0.53) (1.31) (1.02) (1.25) (1.11)
transport -0.3036 ∗∗∗ -0.2410 ∗∗ -0.0584 -0.0645 -0.2760 ∗∗∗ -0.2520 ∗∗∗ -0.2110 ∗∗∗ -0.1780 ∗∗∗ -0.1760 ∗∗∗ -0.1400 ∗∗∗
(-3.36) (-2.50) (-0.58) (-0.62) (-3.24) (-2.89) (-3.10) (-2.83) (-2.43) (-1.96)
electricity -0.2127 ∗∗ -0.2083 ∗∗∗ 0.0757 0.0934 -0.2440 ∗∗∗ -0.2350 ∗∗ -0.0720 -0.0574 -0.1440 ∗∗ -0.1510 ∗∗
(-2.62) (-2.77) (0.81) (0.96) (-2.64) (-2.54) (-1.05) (-0.90) (-2.00) (-2.14)
constant -0.3817 0.1597 0.2150 0.1642 0.1540 0.0742 0.1380 0.0789 1.2510 ∗∗∗ 1.0560 ∗∗
(-1.40) (0.66) (-0.77) (0.59) (0.47) (0.22) (0.61) (0.35) (2.85) (2.39)
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4Table 6 continued:
M        .                      
       ,             
   .                      
       ,                 
   .               
            ,            
   .               
            ,            
   .               
            ,            
Number ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) (  )
year dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
institutional yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
cluster dummies
Number of observations 88 88 100 100 188 188 137 137 128 138
F-statistic 5.26 ∗∗∗ 7.66 ∗∗∗ 3.11 ∗∗∗ 2.52 ∗∗∗ 6.88 ∗∗∗ 6.85 ∗∗∗ 6.78 ∗∗∗ 7.58 ∗∗∗ 2.91 ∗∗∗ 2.80 ∗∗∗
Max. VIF 4.81 4.62 5.50 5.30 5.60 5.40 5.08 4.87 5.60 5.40
Max. VIF without year and 2.15 2.58 2.15 2.58 2.24 2.77 2.33 2.73 2.24 2.77
institutional cluster dummies
Adjusted R2 38.2% 41.8% 23.6% 22.3% 36.0% 36.8% 41.1% 44.4% 36.7% 39.8%
Note: The table gives the results of OLS regressions with diﬀering speciﬁcations. Regressions (1) and (2) reproduce Table 5 for the infra subsample only. Regressions (3) and (4)
reproduce Table 5 for the non-infra subsample only. Regressions (5) and (6) reproduce Table 5 with Ln_MVBV instead of Ln_tobinsQ as dependent variable. Regressions (7)
and (8) reproduce Table 5 including Ln_ROA as an additional independent variable. Regressions (9) and (10) reproduce Table 5 for vehicles with a minimum of 7 cash ﬂow
observations. All regressions use White’s heteroscedasticity-consistent estimators. The independent variables are listed in the ﬁrst column. The following columns show the
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